RICO Lawyer & Attorney : Thomas Walker : Cosho Humphrey Law Firm : RICO Act, Federal and State Racketeering Litigation, Boise Idaho

In Liquidation Commission of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 2446320 (C.A.11 (Fla. June 19, 2008), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") can be applied extraterritorially. This case is a civil RICO and fraudulent transfer case arising out of the 2003 collapse of Banco Intercontinental SA (BanInter), which at that time was among the largest banks in the Dominican Republic. After its collapse, the affairs of BanInter were taken over by the Liquidation Commission, a receivership established by the Dominican government. The Commission brought this suit against Luis Alvarez Renta, a Florida businessman, claiming that Renta, with the help of BanInter insiders, wrongfully diverted millions in BanInter funds to finance other business ventures and personal expenses.

Three RICO claims and one fraudulent transfer claim were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for the Liquidation Commission in all respects. After trebling of the racketeering damages, the judgment totaled approximately $177 million.

Renta appealed, arguing that the entire case should have been dismissed for forum non conveniens, that the RICO claims should have been dismissed for unripeness and because the statute cannot apply extraterritorially. Judge Kravitch, writing for the panel of three judges, upheld the District Court’s judgment. With regarding to the extraterritorial issue, Judge Kravitch framed the initial question as whether Congress intended the statute in question to apply to conduct occurring outside the United States. The Court noted that some courts have held that RICO does not apply to conduct outside of the United States. However, the more widely accepted view, and the one the Eleventh Circuit adopted, is that RICO may apply extraterritorially if conduct material to the completion of the racketeering occurs in the United States, or if significant effects of the racketeering are felt in the United States.

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 Melvyn Weiss, the plaintiffs’ lawyer who pioneered a controversial and lucrative area of law suing corporations on behalf of shareholders, was sentenced on June 2nd in federal court in Los Angeles to 30 months in prison. Weiss pleaded guilty in March to racketeering conspiracy in connection with his former law firm’s alleged improper payments of kickbacks to class-action clients.

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Although not involving a civil RICO claim, the court in Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 2008 WL 623027 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 5, 2008) sanctioned the defendant for failing to produce an email.  Emails are often important evidence in civil RICO cases.  So this decision is noteworthy.  In the Connor case the plaintiff alleged interference and retaliation claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  The plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions based on the defendant’s failure to produce a highly relevant email during discovery. The plaintiff located, through other means, a relevant email that explained her dismissal to other employees. The defendant moved for summary judgment relying on their 30-day email destruction policy which automatically deleted emails that were thirty days old, unless they were first archived by the user. The court, unpersuaded by the defendant’s reasoning, granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and issued an adverse jury instruction.

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Yesterday, April 3, 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Jack Weinstein’s grant of class certification for “light” cigarette litigants in McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 878627 (C.A.2 (N.Y.). Plaintiffs, a group of smokers allegedly deceived-by defendants' marketing and branding-into believing that “light” cigarettes (“Lights”) were healthier than “full-flavored” cigarettes, sought and were granted class certification. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 992 (E.D.N.Y.2006) (Jack B. Weinstein, Judge). Plaintiffs' suit was brought under RICO, with mail and wire fraud as the necessary predicate acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (forbidding “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity”); see also id.§ 1961(1) (providing that mail and wire fraud constitute racketeering activity); cf. id. § 1341 (mail fraud statute); id. § 1343 (wire fraud statute). The essence of plaintiffs’ complaint is that defendants’ implicit representation that Lights were healthier led them to buy Lights in greater quantity than they otherwise would have and at an artificially high price, resulting in plaintiffs' overpayment for cigarettes.  Plaintiffs allege claims arising from their purchase of Lights from 1971, when defendants first introduced Lights, until the date on which trial commences.

With respect to the plaintiffs’ RICO claims, Judge John Walker in the Second Circuit’s opinion noted that Section 1964(c) of Title 18 (“civil RICO”) gives private citizens a cause of action under RICO by providing that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of [RICO's substantive provisions] may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.”18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). To fulfill the requirement that the injury occur “by reason of” a defendant's action, a plaintiff must show “that the defendant's violation not only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.”Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992); see also Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir.2001) ( “RICO's use of the clause ‘by reason of’ has been held to limit standing to those plaintiffs who allege that the asserted RICO violation was the legal, or proximate, cause of their injury, as well as a logical, or ‘but for,’ cause.”). “But for” causation is also known as “transaction causation,” or “reliance,” while proximate causation is often referred to as “loss causation.” See, e.g., Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 169-70 (2d Cir.1999); Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., 57 F.3d 176, 189-90 (2d Cir.1995); see also Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (noting that reliance is “often referred to ... as ‘transaction causation’ ”). Thus, a plaintiff asserting a civil RICO claim must be able to support allegations of (1) a RICO violation, (2) injury, and (3) transaction and loss causation. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 769 (2d Cir.1994). Judge Walker noted that to prevail in their argument for class certification, plaintiffs must establish that the issues of injury and causation do not defeat the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).  For the reasons set forth in the opinion, the Second Circuit found that plaintiffs failed to meet this burden.

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A national class action was certified on March 19, 2008 in New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. First DataBank, Inc., 2008 WL 723774 (D.Mass.) against First DataBank, Inc. and McKesson Corporation. Plaintiffs allege that First DataBank and McKesson engaged in a racketeering enterprise (the “Scheme”) to fraudulently state the “average wholesale price” (“AWP”) for numerous prescription pharmaceuticals beginning in late 2001, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1964 and California state law. The Scheme allegedly jacked up the AWP by five percent for over 400 brand-name, self-administered drugs sold through retail pharmacies, including mail order (the “Marked Up Drugs”). This allegedly fraudulent price hike caused damages to consumers and 11,000 third party payors (“TPPs”) across the nation.

To recap the allegations, beginning in late 2001, First DataBank, a drug pricing publisher, and McKesson, a drug wholesaler, reached a secret agreement to raise the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (“WAC”) to AWP spread from 20% to 25% for the over four hundred Marked Up Drugs. McKesson communicated these new 25% WAC to AWP markups to First DataBank, which then published AWPs with the new markup. To conceal the Scheme, McKesson and First DataBank agreed to effectuate price changes only when some other WAC-based price announcement was made by a drug manufacturer. By 2002, McKesson estimated that 95% of all prescription drug manufacturers used the inflated 25% markup, and that, by 2004, 99% of all prescription drug manufacturers did so. The Scheme ended on March 15, 2005, when First DataBank disclosed that it had ceased to conduct surveys of the market to obtain AWP information, contradicting prior statements.

The Scheme allegedly resulted in higher profits for retail pharmacies that purchase drugs on the basis of WAC, but get reimbursed on the basis of AWP.  According to the Plaintiffs, McKesson implemented the Scheme in order to provide this greater AWP “spread” to important retail pharmacy clients like Rite Aid and Walmart as well as its own pharmacy related businesses.

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Since state and federal racketeering cases must be based upon the commission of a crime, defendants in a civil racketeering case need to be aware of the likelihood that a parallel criminal investigation will be conducted during the pendency of the civil case. This reality presents significant risks to the civil racketeering defendant. I plan to deal with the enormous difficulties faced by a defendant exposed to parallel civil and criminal prosecutions in later posts. For now I just want to provide an overview of the criminal discovery process.

At the outset the point must be made that the government’s ability to discover information is significantly broader than that of a defendant, although a defendant’s rights are protected by certain constitutional guarantees.

1.  Investigation

The most obvious source of information for the prosecution is the investigatory arm of law enforcement. By the time the prosecution’s attention is drawn to an individual, law enforcement has typically gathered substantial evidence relating to the alleged offense. The government’s ability to gather evidence is further enhanced by the use of search and seizure, a mechanism not available to the defense.

Like the government, defendants can employ investigators to gather potential exculpatory evidence. However, an innocent defendant has no prior knowledge of the accusations against which he must defend himself and a defendant who has committed many crimes does not know which the government has discovered. Consequently, the defendant must rely on the government’s disclosures to calculate how best to present a defense.

2.  Grand Jury

Grand jury proceedings provide another significant avenue for the prosecution to gather evidence. It is a “fundamental maxim” that the grand jury “has a right to every man’s evidence....”  Before the grand jury, prosecutors have wide latitude to compel testimony and obtain documentary evidence without the restrictions imposed by the state and federal rules of evidence and out of the presence of the defendant and his counsel.

Unlike the prosecution, the defendant has little or no access to grand jury proceedings. A defendant may not even be aware of a grand jury investigation until it is complete. Further, state and federal rules of criminal procedure require that grand jury proceedings be kept confidential.

3. Constitutional Disclosure

The Constitution requires the prosecution to produce certain evidence material to the defense. The most familiar requirement is the prosecution’s obligation to produce exculpatory evidence.  The United States Supreme Court has held that the government’s failure to provide a defendant with exculpatory evidence in its possession violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. This obligation extends to evidence that a defendant can use to impeach the government’s witnesses.

4.  Discovery Authorized by Statute

The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, provides that statements by government witnesses in the hands of the government must be produced, but not until after those witnesses have testified. Certain statutes provide some defendants with additional discovery. For example, defendants charged with capital offenses are entitled to a list of the witnesses against them at least three days before commencement of trial.

5.  Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

A. Rule 16. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the parties disclose certain information. Upon request, the prosecution must provide certain statements made by the defendant; the defendant’s criminal record; access to certain physical evidence; and reports related to expert, scientific, and medical evidence. Significantly, the Rule does not require disclosure of statements made by government witnesses.

Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that after a witness testifies, a party may compel production of any relevant statements made by that witness. The Rule does not provide a method for discovery of statements or documents in the hands of a non-party even if they are relevant statements by a witness who has testified.

B. Rule 17(c) Subpoenas

Finally, there is Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

(1) In General. A subpoena may order the witness to produce any books, papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates. The court may direct the witness to produce the designated items in court before trial or before they are to be offered in evidence. When the items arrive, the court may permit the parties and their attorneys to inspect all or part of them.

(2) Quashing or Modifying the Subpoena. On motion made promptly, the court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.

6.  Cases

There are numerous cases dealing with criminal discovery, a discussion of which is well beyond the scope of this post.

7. Conclusion.

This brief overview is intended only as an introduction to the criminal discovery process. Books have been written about it. Hopefully this information will be helpful.

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The Supreme Court on Monday October 15^th rejected an appeal by Microsoft Corp. and a unit of Best Buy Co. to dismiss a lawsuit alleging violation of racketeering laws through fraudulently signing up customers for Microsoft's online service.

The companies asked the justices to overturn a May ruling by the San Francisco-based U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, which said the civil suit could proceed. The Supreme Court is letting that ruling stand, which means the class-action lawsuit involving thousands of consumers with complaints against the companies will be litigated in federal district court.

Under a joint venture, Redmond, Wash.-based Microsoft invested $200 million in Richfield, Minn.-based Best Buy in April 2000 and agreed to promote the retailer's online store through its Internet access service, MSN. In turn, Best Buy agreed to promote MSN in its stores.

The dispute began in 2003, when James Odom sued the companies after purchasing a laptop computer at Best Buy.

Best Buy allegedly signed up Odom for a six-month free trial of MSN with the credit card he used to pay for the computer. After the trial ended, Microsoft began charging him for the account.

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A New Jersey federal judge on Friday, September 28^th, threw out the remaining racketeering claims pending against several dozen insurers and brokers in a class action lawsuit stemming from industry wide investigations into bid-rigging and client-steering allegations.

The decision, which follows a recent ruling dismissing antitrust claims against the brokers and insurers, resolves the major claims in the consolidated litigation brought on behalf of commercial property/casualty insurance policyholders and employee benefit plan sponsors, who sued the firms following the investigations initiated by then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.

Plaintiffs alleged that the companies engaged in a conspiracy in which they allocated clients, fixed prices and restrained trade in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. In earlier rulings, Judge Brown and a previously assigned judge rejected antitrust and RICO allegations against the insurers and brokers. Judge Brown earlier this year gave plaintiffs a final chance to amend their filings and bolster their case with supplemental pleadings.

After ruling in late August that the consolidated suit lacked factual support for claims of a widespread antitrust conspiracy, U.S. District Judge Garrett E. Brown Jr. said Friday the suit also lacked factual evidence of a RICO enterprise.

“Plaintiffs’ allegations offer nothing more than a kaleidoscope of acts executed by a kaleidoscope of actors, and combine broker-defendants and insurer-defendants in such a fashion that the court is unable to discern any systemic permutation,” Judge Brown wrote in his 73-page decision. “While discussing dozens of transactions and hundreds of actors, plaintiffs fail to outline even a single set of actors that interacted with each other and executed their transactions systemically.”

The plaintiffs alleged the brokers and insurers participated in the operation or management of a RICO enterprise by, among other things, reaching agreements with each of the insurers regarding the amount of contingent commissions to be paid to the broker and the level of business to be steered to each insurer defendant and then coordinated the concealment of the scheme, according to court papers.

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A case reported out of the United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division on July 25, 2007, Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 2007 WL 2127210 (E.D.Va.), reminded me of the unique breadth of RICO. In Rux, the court referred to Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10^th Cir. 1999). The 10^th Circuit held in Southway that the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) was enforceable against a foreign state by virtue of an exception contained in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.

The Rux case arose from the October 12, 2000, terrorist bombing of the American warship U.S.S. Cole during a temporary refueling stop in the Port of Aden, Yemen, in which seventeen American sailors were killed.  Plaintiffs, consisting of more than fifty surviving family members of the deceased sailors, allege that Defendant Republic of Sudan was liable for damages from the attack because it provided material support and assistance to Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization whose operatives planned and carried out the attack. Plaintiffs brought their action pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which establishes subject matter jurisdiction for personal injury or death resulting from acts of state-sponsored terrorism. Upon evidence adduced at a non-jury trial before this Court on March 13-14, 2007, the Court awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the total amount of $7,956,344.

As I have noted in previous posts, although some state racketeering acts provide a cause of action arising out of personal injuries, federal RICO does not. So, unlike in the Rux case, in order to recover damages under the federal civil RICO statute, a plaintiff must prove injury to his business or property “by reason of a violation of section 1962” of RICO. But, damage to business or property is often a result of terrorist criminal acts. Consequently, RICO may provide a remedy for those persons who suffer such losses because of terrorist activity, if the facts fit one of the exceptions in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.

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Douglas M. Jennings designed an aftermarket dashboard bezel-that is, a molded shape that fits over an automobile's instrument panel. Hoping to make money from his design through manufacturing and selling his bezels in the auto parts aftermarket and to forestall copycats, Jennings applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) for a patent. As part of her review of Jennings's application, the patent Examiner contacted defendants Auto Meter Products, Inc., Gauge Works, LLC, and Gregory Day to inquire whether the bezel they were selling was on sale or publicly available before Jennings applied for his patent. Jennings believes that the defendants, in response to the Examiner's inquiries, fraudulently misled her into believing that Jennings was not in fact the inventor of the bezel.

In addition to continuing to pursue his patent application, Jennings filed a civil lawsuit against the defendants under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). RICO fit the bill, in Jennings's opinion, because the defendants were engaged in “the type of unfair competition that one would expect from a Mafia family or narcotics cartel.” His complaint alleged that the defendants had commandeered the PTO through a pattern of racketeering activity by flooding it (via mail and wire transmissions) with false information in order to deny Jennings a patent and thereby “exploit the market for the bezel without compensating Jennings for use of his invention.”

Unfortunately for Mr. Jennings, neither William T. Lawrence, Magistrate Judge, sitting in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit bought his pitch.

Although plaintiffs continue to amaze me with their “innovative” theories, nearly all courts are unreceptive to RICO being "commandeered" to gain leverage in ordinary commercial disputes. See the Seventh Circuit’s opinion at Jennings v. Auto Meter Products, Inc., 2007 WL 2120337 (C.A.7 (Ind.).

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For some reason pro se litigants (persons representing themselves) are attracted to RICO. My informal survey indicates that dozens of frivilous RICO claims are filed in state and federal courts each year. They almost always result in dismissal, with prejudice, at the very early stages of the lawsuit – mostly for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. As noted in my previous posts, pleading and proving a RICO case is a daunting task, but this fact does not seem to dissuade some people with an ax to grind.  A decision entered in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada on July 5, 2007 provides an entertaining example of a person with a problem – you decide what his problem is.   The District Court’s decision in Charles Caston, et al. v. U.S. President George BUSH, Jr., et al. provides the following recitation of the relief Mr. Caston sought in his RICO lawsuit.

Charles Caston, acting pro se, has brought suit on his own behalf and on the behalf of Casinos Las Vegas, Reno. Plaintiff is suing U.S. President George Bush, Jr. [sic], Governor Gibbons, George Bush, Nancy Poloski [sic], California Governor Arnold Swartznagger [sic], Texas Governor Rick Perry, New York Governor George Pataki [sic], Vice President Dick Chaney, and Mexico's President Andres Manuel Lopex Obrador [sic] for violating his constitutional rights. Plaintiff asks the court to seize 84 Lumber, Office Depot, the Pentagon, and the White House. Plaintiff also requests the court to stop the war in Iraq and release the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan.

The Court goes on to note:

Plaintiff claims that the Pentagon and the White House need to be seized because they are involved in R.I.C.O. violations and overcharging plaintiff everything he buys. Plaintiff also accuses an unspecified defendant of controlling the slot machines, breaking and entering his storage unit, taking money out of his bank account, and black mailing American Indians. Further, plaintiff claims that urine was poured on him while he slept, he is being stalked by U.S. Military personnel, and that his cousin was killed by the U.S. Military. Finally, plaintiff states that he is being denied a home, a family, a drivers license, and sex with women. Given the delusional allegations of plaintiff's Complaint, the legal and factual deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment.

Not surprisingly, the Court dismissed Mr. Caston’s complaint with prejudice. In any event, thanks, Mr. Caston, for the entertainment value of your RICO claims.

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As I noted in my last post, a civil RICO plaintiff must plead and prove direct injury "by reason of" the defendant’s RICO violation. But pleading and proving direct causation may not be enough to save a plaintiff’s claim from dismissal. Section 1964(c) limits injuries to a plaintiff’s “business or property”:

Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore . . . and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . . (Emphasis added).

So, not all injuries are provided a remedy under the RICO Act. Most notably personal injuries are not compensable under RICO. As with RICO’s direct injury requirement, Courts have used the "business or property" standard as a means of promptly dismissing claims that they consider beyond the Act’s intended scope. The clear message is – Don’t bring a RICO claim in order to gain leverage in an ordinary tort case.

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The Journal of the American Association for Justice reported in its June 2007 issue that the Third Circuit ruled that policyholders can bring federal racketeering suits against insurers in New Jersey despite the state’s lack of provisions for private rights of action.

The decision in Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 968391 (3d Cir. Apr. 3, 2007) overturned a lower court’s reverse preemption ruling and held that RICO claims are not barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which prohibits any federal law that would “invalidate, impair, or supersede” state insurance law unless it specifically relates to the business of insurance.

“There is nothing in the regulatory scheme that indicates that allowing other remedies as part of its regulation of insurance would frustrate or interfere with New Jersey’s insurance regime,” Judge Marjorie Rendell wrote, concluding that RICO augments, rather than impairs, the state’s insurance law.

Richard Weiss, a former investment banker, was disabled in 2001 after a heart attack left him with permanent left ventricular dysfunction and extremely low blood pressure. He had short- and long-term disability benefits provided by First Unum through his employer at the time, Tucker Anthony Sutro. The insurer paid Weiss short-term disability benefits and then approved long-term benefits of more than $11,000 a month, but it discontinued payments after three months.

Weiss, who initially sued to recover losses under state law, added the RICO claim when First Unum moved the case to federal court, alleging that the state law claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Weiss argued that the insurer violated RICO by discontinuing his disability payments as part of its racketeering scheme to stop paying expensive claims.

The ruling expanded on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, in which the justices held that RICO claims would not frustrate the goals of Nevada’s insurance law. (525 U.S. 299 (1999).) The defense argued that unlike in Nevada, New Jersey insurance law neither allows a statutory private right of action for nonpayment of benefits nor specifically makes punitive damages available in these cases.

But the Third Circuit found that the remedies established in the state’s Insurance Trade Practices Act (ITPA) “are not intended to be exclusive.”

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There are four substantive liability sections in the RICO Act: 18 U.S.C. 1962(a) through (d). Each of these sections shares common terms and concepts, including “racketeering”, “person”, “enterprise”, “association with the enterprise”, “pattern of racketeering activity”, “relationship among racketeering acts”, and “conducting the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering”. These terms have been discussed in previous posts and will be addressed in the next weeks and months.   However, I want to touch on conspiracy in this post. Conspiracy is specifically covered in the RICO Act.

Subsection 1962(d) makes it unlawful for any person to conspire with any other person to violate Subsections 1962(a), (b) or (c). As I have mentioned in my previous posts, a RICO claim is broad, but a RICO conspiracy claim is even broader. In a RICO conspiracy it is the agreement by a defendant that is necessary for liability. So, a defendant can be engage in a conspiracy even if he does not commit the substantive acts that could constitute violations of Subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Section 1962. An agreement to commit the acts is all that’s needed.

Unlike the general federal conspiracy statute, a RICO conspiracy does not even require proof of an overt act. A conspirator need only intend to further a venture which, if completed, would satisfy all elements of a civil RICO claim. Although very broad the RICO conspiracy statute is not limitless and its interpretation and application are – like most of RICO – loaded with nuances. Many courts require that a RICO conspiracy claim be pled with specificity. So, a careful review of the cases dealing with RICO, including Salinas v. U.S., 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469 (1997) is mandatory.

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