No RICO remedies available against BLM employees
In late June 2007, the United States Supreme Court held in Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 WL 1804315 (U.S.) (June 25,2007), that BLM officials did not violate RICO by their cumulative and very aggressive actions to force Frank Robbins, a Wyoming guest ranch operator, to regrant the government an easement across his private land. The lengthy statement of facts included in the decision by Justice Souter defies summarization because – in the words of Justice Souter – “The substance of Robbins's claim, and the degree to which existing remedies available to him were adequate, can be understood and assessed only by getting down to the details, which add up to a long recitation.” Suffice it to say that the Court seemed to be sympathetic to Mr. Robbins, but rather half-heartedly held that he had adequate non-RICO remedies available to him -- some Robbins unsuccessfully asserted and some he didn’t claim at all.
Justice Souter framed the issues as follows: “The questions here are whether the landowner has either a private action for damages of the sort recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), or a claim against the officials in their individual capacities under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). We hold that neither action is available.”
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Robbins had a clearly established right to be free from retaliation for exercising his Fifth Amendment right to exclude the Government from his private property, Robbins v. Wilkie, 433 F.3d 755, 765-767 (2006), and it explained that Robbins could go forward with the RICO claim because Government employees who “engag[e] in lawful actions with an intent to extort a right-of-way from [a landowner] rather than with an intent to merely carry out their regulatory duties” commit extortion under Wyoming law and within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 68. The Court of Appeals rejected the defense based on a claim of the Government's legal entitlement to demand the disputed easement: “if an official obtains property that he has lawful authority to obtain, but does so in a wrongful manner, his conduct constitutes extortion under the Hobbs Act.” Id., at 769. However, the Supreme Court reversed as follows:
RICO does not give Robbins a claim against defendants in their individual capacities. Robbins argues that the predicate act for his RICO claim is a violation of the Hobbs Act, which criminalizes interference with interstate commerce by extortion, along with attempts or conspiracies, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and defines extortion as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent ... under color of official right,” § 1951(b)(2). Robbins’s claim fails because the Hobbs Act does not apply when the National Government is the intended beneficiary of allegedly extortionate acts.”
Upon review of the extensive recitation of “bad acts” by the government employees, I was left with the abiding feeling that Robbins’s RICO claims should have survived. But, in accord with a clear trend in the federal courts, the Supreme Court is not inclined to allow a plaintiff to avail himself of RICO remedies, if there are other adequate (in the mind of the court) remedies available to the plaintiff.
